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Thomas: Medical Prophecy and the Single Award: The Problem and a Proposal

MEDICAL PROPHECY AND THE SINGLE AWARD:
THE PROBLEM AND A PROPOSAL
Ralph C. Thomas*
Personal injury litigation is the target of much criticism. This
criticism ranges from thoughtful analysis to uninformed vituperation. Emphasis is placed on its delay, uncertainty, lack of scientific
method and disregard of social or economic considerations. Blame
is conferred impartially, or at least generously, upon all its participants: lawyers, litigants, witnesses, juries and trial judges. Although
no one of its participants is likely to emerge unscarred from an
examination of the problem, it is submitted that even if all were
the best disposed, the instrument
*Mr. Thomas received his B.A.

in 1949 from the University of
Tulsa and his LL.B. from the University of Oklahoma in 1955. From
1950 to 1955 he was in private
practice before he became professor of law at the University of

Tulsa. This article is based on a

paper prepared for a seminar on

Medical Proof in Legal Proceedings presented at New York University.

they work with is so imperfect that
most of the deficiencies would remain.

Assuming that we often fail to
see a familiar object in all its detail until we consciously focus on
it, this study will
begin
withaa
begin with
il
ncessarily b
rief dissection of the
ne

damage elements of personal in-

litigation. The damage element is singled out because it is
this element which conditions the whole process.
Personal injury damages are compensatory rather than punitive. They follow only on a finding of liability. This is the articulate
premise of personal injury litigation.' Compensatory damages partake of the notion of repairing the economic imbalance caused by
the tortious act. Their function is restoration of money expended
for palliative action taken as the result of trauma, compensation
for lost earning capacity and compensation for non-economic deprivations such as pain and suffering and physical impairment which
has not caused economic loss. The community has a stake in the
reparation of the economic imbalance caused by debts and deprivation of earnings. The allowance of compensation for non-economic
jury

I That there are inarticulate premises such as retribution and covert
conduct regulation is recognized. That the fault concept as a basis for award
is under attack is likewise conceded, but it is beyond the scope of this paper
to treat of these factors in detail. It is against the articulated premise that
the significant phenomena will be measured.
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loss is a recognition of social2 and psychic factors as distinguished
from purely economic ones.
A singular, but commonplace, fact is that the award is made
in a lump sum and is payable, or at least is due in toto at the time
of the award. Any variables which would affect the amount of the
award must be presented at trial. Any mistake in proof latent
in the factual situation at trial time does not affect the verdict unless brought to the court's attention within the compass of the short
period of time allotted for perfecting an appeal on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. This rule, calling for a single determination of liability good for all time, is based upon the interdict
against splitting causes of action.3
Reliance on a single trial provokes considerable strain. The
participants, lest they suffer irreparable error, will ask, or refuse,
or give too much or too little. Perhaps the most pernicious influence
of the guessing game this rule imposes on the jury is that many of
their verdicts result from compromise, thereby, in a factual sense,
insufficiently compensating plaintiff in some cases and over-compensating -him in others. 4
An analysis of the elements of damage in the typical personal

injury action reveals that they divide principally into six categories.6 These categories are past medical expenses, prospective medical expense, loss of earnings in the past, prospective loss of earning
capacity, past or experienced pain and suffering, and future or prospective pain and suffering. Of these categories, such medical expense and loss of earnings as have been experienced in the past are

capable of satisfactory proof in the sense that they need not be established by the unsupported oral assertions of plaintiff himself,
2

TRACy, Tim DocToR AS A WrrNss 135-137 (1957).
3 This rule stems from Fitter v. Veal, 12 Mod. 542, 88 Eng.Rep. 1506
(1701). Plaintiff, who filed a second suit when a piece of bone came out
of his head after final judgment, was denied a second trial, the court holding
that it was or should have been within the intendment of the first trial to
compensate him for all eventualities. This case has been generally relied on.
See Eller v. Carolina & W. Ry., 140 N.C. 140, 52 S.E. 305 (1905); and
SEDGEwicK, D.NiAcxs § 84 (9th ed. 1912). The inadequacy and danger of
rule 4is noted in MAYNE & MCGREGoR, DA cGEs 186-188, (12th ed. 1961).
1Rectification of errors by the litigants after they become apparent is,
of course, possible, although unlikely. The plaintiff whose pessimistic prognosis is proven wrong is free to refund. In like fashion the defendant who
sees that plaintiff's injuries were more grave in fact is free to enhance.
It would be a good guess that incidents such as these are so rare that few
lawyers have seen one. Basically the non-existence of such conduct shows
that there is little co-incidence between damages sought or defended against
and human compassion or morality. In addition to human cupidity there is
another reason why these amelioratory actions do not occur. When the occasion
arises the parties may not be able to rectify. The plaintiff may have spent
all his award. The defendant may have dedicated his money to other pursuits 5after the passage of the danger of damage dedication.
That there are others is recognized. See Ratner v. Arrington, 111
So.2d 82 (Fla.App. 1959) where plaintiff asked for damages for "inability
to lead a normal life," as well as for physical disability and loss of earning
capacity.
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but may be established by other witnesses as well as by documents
and records. The remaining categories are subjective in the sense
they do not lend themselves to precise measurement and award
by a confident trier of fact.
Pain differs from pathological lesions in that it does not manifest itself to the eye, ear or touch. It must either be shown by other
means or go unacknowledged unless the claims of plaintiff are accepted for other reasons than inhere in satisfactory real proof. Accordingly its establishment is attended by considerations which do
not obtain in establishing the cognizable physical trauma. The
dilemma of the patient who seeks to verbalize his pain is thrown
into sharp focus by the medical position that no one6 can tell by any
known means when one is or is not suffering pain.
There would seem to be a high content of validity in the theory
that pain and suffering ordinarily have secondary manifestations
which are reliable factors in assessing plaintiff's complaints. To
the extent that this is acceptable, this theory or te~hnique serves
to refute the assertion that no known means exists for ascertaining
when another is suffering pain. Typical objective symptoms are:
emotional depression, physical weakness and change of facial expression at the onset of pain, involuntary muscle spasm, perspiraof pulse and blood pressure under the stimution and abnormalities
7
lus of pain.
As the medical witness's duty is evaluative with respect to
pain, its recognition and quantification is an important part of forensic medicine. Because pain is highly subjective and difficult of
identification and measurement8 it is often scamped by practitioners
oT industrial medicine.9 As a result, one indignant lawyer has advocated that the doctor should be warned against minimizing or
ignoring the patient's complaints of pain
10 lest he be subjected to
the "fiercest type of cross examination."
In addition to evaluation of pain and its concomitant disability, the diagnosis of objective findings carries with it the duty to
6Schlemer, The Doctor's Role in the Medical Legal Case, 14 U.

DET.

L.

J.

184, 186 (1951).

7Komblitt, Proof and Disproof of Exaggerated Disability in Personal
Injury Cases, 1955 C RRr MEl. 27,28.
8 Serious attempts to meet this burden are reflected in such devices as
a machine for measuring pain, the Dolorimeter. See the description in
CumBAN, LAw Azm MEDiciNE 525 (1960); and Komblitt, 1953 CuuNT
MED. 2, suggesting a graduation of units of pain, "dols," from a value of one
to ten. A grade of ten, for example, is assigned to a burning cigarette held
against the skin, a blow to the testicles, and to some labor pains during the
second or third stage of delivery. Two dols are assigned to most toothaches,
most back injuries, and to arthritis. Kornblitt also suggests that the tolerance
of pain is affected by body type and disposition, the ectomorph suffering
most and the mesomorph least.
9Barritt, The Evaluation of Subjective Disability, 25 IN. MED. SURr.
417 (1956).
lo Longan, Preparation of Medical Testimony, 17 MoNT. L. BEv. 121
(1956).
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evaluate the attendant disability in terms of quantity and duration."
A physician aware of the prophetic and evaluative demands of the
trial must provide a prognosis good for all time or someone, either
plaintiff or defendant, suffers. The medical witness must not only
establish the residual disability and its probable duration, but also
must testify to the quantum of probable future pain and its estimated life. To say this constitutes a heavy burden is to understate.
A rational approach by both doctor and lawyer recognizes the
character of the burden. The impact of injury on the variable factors
of personality, the compensatory bodily reactions and the difference in the physical and psychological reactions of each individual
must be assessed. Recognition must also be accorded that the doctor's must
own subjective approach colors his diagnosis and prognosis
.and
be guarded against. These few considerations sketch the
alarming outlines of the problem. Some consolation is found in the
fact that the doctor may call to his aid the accumulated experience
and knowledge of the medical profession and apply the great general average2 to the individual, as a conditioning factor in particular
evaluation .1
The problem of causation is a vexing one to the doctor. Doctors complain that medical cause is different from cause in law and
that unreasonable demands are made on them to define cause in
terms of legal rather than medical concepts. Physicians, it is argued,
are occupied with determining in what fashion a human being has
met injury only in order to apply the proper corrective and palliative procedures. The law asks them to assign a cause to the patholthat cause to either include or exclude
ogy they find and to narrow
13
the asserted tortious act.
One lawyer, in his text for doctors, points out that the hypothetical question addressed to a doctor asks him to base his answer
on the "reasonable probability" of the opinion he renders being
true. He continues:
"That is a difficult problem for a doctor witness, for he is accustomed to thinking not of probabilities but of scientific proof,
which usually is conclusive proof. However, in deciding a
legal controversy, we can seldom hope for conclusive proofs.
Otherwise, real wrongs would go unremedied. What the law
demands of the doctor is his opinion on the reasonable probability of a certain result from the facts submitted to him. The
doctor, in testifying, must be careful to keep in mind this
distinction between scientific proof and legal proof, and he
should not shrink from venturing his opinion if he thinks his
conclusion is reasonably probable . . . 4
11 TAcY, op cit. supra note 2, at 125, 134.
121d. at 127.
13 For a thoughtful discussion of this conflict see Brahdy & Kahn, Clinical Approach to Alleged Traumatic Disease, 23 B.U.L. REv. 238 (1943).
14 TkAc op. cit. supra note 2, at 45.
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This not only takes the doctor outside of his chosen domain,
but it introduces him to avenues of thought alien to his experience
and training. Particularly is this so in those fields which are really
battlegrounds of belief where medical analysis has not stablilized
and where opposing theories contend for supremacy.15
A truly formidable burden is discerned when attention is directed toward the duty of the jury. It is but a truism to say that
none of the participants, with the possible exception of the litigants, know the truth in a lawsuit, but it falls the jury's duty to
approximate truth and express it in their verdict. Unlike the witnesses who testify in the hope that they will be believed but who
have no adjudicatory function, the jury must evaluate, must search6
for objective truth and must express this truth in terms of money.3
Although the limits have not been marked out, it would seem
that there exists a large area of community tradition about wounds
and their pains.17 Suffering is an item of proof that is little questioned by the jury if the asserted suffering coincides with their
experience. When the plaintiff with the mangled or amputated
extremity testifies to pain the jury believes because all jurors have
had some experience, although possibly misleading, with the pain
of bruises and wounds. Kalven's Chicago jury experimentation led
him to this generalization:
"Whatever the law's interest in keeping the trial record aseptic, it cannot in fact prevent the juror from augmenting it out
of his own experience . . .One recurring instance of this has

special relevance for the damage issue. It concerns the juror's
reactions to medical testimony and to illness in general. It may
be as simple as the juror's identification with the injured plaintiff where he himself or a close friend or relative has experienced a comparable injury... It may take the form of grave
suspicion of ills less obvious than the broken leg . . ."18
';A current controversy is the relationship between trauma and cancer.

See the conflicting opinions of the doctors in the trial transcript of Menarde
v. Philadelphia Transp. Co. reprinted in Cum , op. cit. supra note 8, at
89-113.
16"The first point that impresses is simply how difficult the job really
is. The jury almost always is asked to reach decision on imperfect, incomplete and conflicting evidence. And to a stunning degree this is true where
future damages are claimed in the personal injury action. Here the jury is
asked to guess the future. How long will plaintiff live? How quickly and how
fully will he recover? How long will he need medical treatment? How long

will the pain last?

. . .

This ambiguity . .. disturbs them.. ." Kalven, The

Jury, The Law And ThAe Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHo ST. L. J.

158, 165 (1958).

17Two physicians have written: "Certain courts have taken judicial
notice that the greater the wound the greater the resultant pain. This is false
though appealing logic... A very small lesion may produce very great pain,
while a much larger wound may produce substantially less pain." Smith &

Hubbard, Doing Scientific Justice: Psychological Reactions to Traumatic
Stimuli, 1962 U. Ill. L. F. 190, 195.
18 Kalven, supra note 16 at 175.
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It is in the more exotic injuries that the lingering trauma provides problems of credulity for the jury. When the assertion of
persisting pain is made, although the bruise has vanished without
trace, belief comes less readily. There is strong suspicion in lay as
well as legal minds that the field of perjury in thp category of pain
and suffering is wide. Curiously the very vagueness of complaints
may help a plaintiff in some instances. The inference created that
trusted relabackfires when the juror or adisorders
plaintiff
is a malingerer
and
experienced the same subjective
tive
met or
thefriend
same has
seeming
medical indifference.' 9

The remaining two categories, future medical expenses and
loss of earnings, have a high content of incredulity. Proof offered
on these categories must come from the lips of expert witnesses
who offer prognosis of future events for evaluation by the present
day jury. Likewise, there is a reservoir of community awareness,
for instance, that a paraplegic will consult a doctor frequently and
suffer loss of earnings. This recognition is generally reserved for
those whose wounds and lesions are still fresh, or, if of some duration, are familiar and recognizable.20 The threshold of belief is less
high. But where plaintiff has no external manifestations of residual
injury and testimony is presented that his normal appearing neck
is painful and that the cervical vertebrae need periodic stretching
to alleviate pain, disbelief is ready.
In addition, the jury's evaluative duties encompass matters not
considered by the doctor such as the rise and fall of the dollar and
the demand for reduction
21 of the lump sum judgment for future
wages to present worth.
To these legally defined considerations the jury adds other of
its own genesis, such as the possibility of change of occupation,
with consequent mitigation of damages; the possibility of fortuitous
death or equally fortuitous recovery which would make meaningless a prospective award for pain and loss of earnings; and their
assessment of plaintiff's actual need for the money and defendant's
ability to pay it. The jury's operations might be likened to combining the prophetic capabilities of a Daniel with the arithmetical
infallibility of an electronic computer.
Little is known of the actual rationale of juries, or for that
matter, of judges sitting as triers of fact. 22 In general it is recog'9
20

Ibid.

See generally Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 Omo ST. L. J.

200, 204 (1958).

"of course,

where plaintiff has suffered a tangible physical

injury such as the loss of a bodily member, the jury is not likely to err in

determining that in fact there was pain and suffering. A person who loses an
arm . . . undoubtedly endures pain. It would be phenomenal if he did not.
The difficult cases are those in which there are no objective symptoms with
which2 1the existence of pain can be associated."
Leasure, How to Prove Reduction to Present Worth, 21 Omo ST. L. J.
M04 (1960).
22 See Green's wry comment: "FTJrial by jury is an admirable device for
enabling trial judges to avoid uncomfortable responsibilities by passing them
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nized that plaintiff suffers in his award according to the amount
of participation in his own injury.23 It is also recognized that the
economic circumstances of the parties, apparent or divined, condition the award. It is not known how much or how important a
factor is the uncertainty of the jury stemming from the non-objective nature of the proof. It is a matter of conjecture how much if
any it affects their judgment when there is no liability or resource
issue to temper their judgment.
In most personal injury actions the damages are established
in the sense that testimony is offered to support the whole of the
ad damnum, with the exception of the value assigned to pain and
suffering, which is totally incapable of objective measurement.
The-remainder of the evidence consists of medical prognosis of
definite content which applied to known factors such as wages
earned before injury and the cost of medicine, drugs and hospital
attention is capable of producing by simple arithmetic the sums of
special damage in the prayer. There is enough evidence to "get to
the jury" on every item. Despite this, in countless cases, less than
the ad damnum is returned where liability is not a real issue. Kalyen notes this phenomenon and comments:
"It is a major characteristic of the jury's approach to damages
that it does not much concern itself with the damage components as an accountant might but searches rather for a single
sum that is felt to be appropriate. Whether any instruction
could turn the jury away from its gestalt approach to a more
explicit concern with adding component sums I do not know.
But I do have a fairly firm impression from our project materials that the result would be in general to increase damages
rather than to deflate them. If one seriously assesses the comthey are likely to add
ponents in any case of any magnitude
24
up to a surprisingly large figure."
It is submitted that the jury has in many instances discounted
the verdict because they have seen that there has been exaggeration both of injury and of freedom from injury. Their compromise
verdict is the litmus paper which discloses their realization that
the typical personal injury case encourages over evaluation on
the one side and under emphasis on the other. It indicates their
appreciation that the belief of litigants is that anything said by an
interested litigant is suspect and therefore must be enlarged enough
that the correct measure will be retained when the suspected surplusage is discarded. This, after all, is the process of bargaining. It
is a familiar concept to the jury. Neither side in a bargain dares
on the juries." M. Green, Juries and Justice-The Jury's Role in Personal Injury Cases, 1962, U. Ill. L.F. 152, 156.
23 Id.at 159.
24 Kalven, supra note 16 at 161-162.
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state at the outset the terms of the exchange he will accept for fear
that the other will take that as his own point of departure.
It is submitted that the uncertainty factor emanating from
the elusiveness of truth leads the jury to temper their verdicts in
cases where defendant's liability has been made apparent in the
same fashion they temper them in the cases of doubtful liability or
doubtful pecuniary need or pecuniary responsibility.
This uncertainty factor also seems to be one of the most powerful inducements for trial. The same factors which make for incredulity in the jury affect the litigants. The plaintiff, assuming
he recognizes the uncertainty problem and its pressures on defendant, is largely helpless to condition his conduct, on this account.
If he reduces his demand to eliminate all those factors which do
not lend themselves to precise computation he will surely settle
his case. But he realizes that if he eliminates an aspect uncertain
of fruition which later becomes certain, the mischief is done. 25 Nor
can defendant indulge him. Accordingly, each person has reason
to seek the intervention of the trier of fact who will dispose of the
controversy despite its uncertainty.2 6 Each side hopes the uncertainty will be resolved in his favor and this is the incentive to seek
trial.
The majority of the comment leveled at the conduct of personal injury litigation centers around the plethora of trials with the
consequent delay in the courts2 7 and the uncertainty of result with
its concomitant social disadvantages. The proposed solutions are
many, in the main calling for some way of expediting the disposition of automobile accident claims which comprise the major part
of personal injury litigation. These proposals run the gamut from
the simple expedient of adding more judges and more courtrooms,
to some form of compulsory insurance and reparation payments
made as in Workmens Compensation.2 8 Partial solutions are advanced in plans for impartial medical testimony, abolition of contingent fees and elimination of damages for pain and suffering.20
25 Of course, there are instances where his release may be set aside for
mutual mistake of material fact, but usually a release once signed is allowed
to rest6 unchallenged.
2 M. Green, supra note 22 at 158.
27
See generally L. GREEN, TRAimuc VIcTnIs: TORT LAW AND INSURANCZ
81 (1958) and ZEisEL, KALvEm & BUCHHOLZ, DELAY nr COURT (1959), the
latter28a careful exhaustive study of court congestion and proposed solutions.
See L. GREEmN, op. cit. supra note 27 at 87-103; and Berger, Compensation Plans for Personal Injuries, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 217, discussing the
Saskatchewan Plan of accident compensation which is companion to ordinary
common
law liability.
29
"But why we may ask should the plaintiff be compensated in money
for an experience which involves no financial loss. It cannot be on the principle of returning what is his own. Essentially that principle rests upon an
economic foundation: on maintaining the integrity of the economic arrangements which provide the normally expectable basis for livelihood in our society." Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw
& CoTEMP,. PEOB. 219, 224 (1953).
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Court administrators, pre-trial conferences, certificates of readiness
and arbitrators have also been suggested. 0
It is submitted that most of the palliative devices suggested
either miss or beg the question. Many of the compensation plans
suggested contain the device of limitation of damages. Like Workmen's Compensation, they sacrifice the ideal of exact or near exact
reparation for certainty of some payment.31 The abolition of payment for pain and suffering would simplify greatly the trial of
personal injury cases because it would leave as subjective only that
portion of the damages which relates to prospective medical expenses and loss of wages. The question remains whether this is not
too high a price to pay for celerity of disposition. 2 If pain and
suffering is to be eliminated because of its difficulty of expression,
in terms of money it is arguable that a great many other items of
damage which arise in a derivative fashion from personal injury
and death must go also. To be consistent in ridding ourselves of
imponderables in proof we should eschew causes of action for loss
of consortium and social deprivation stemming from death. In addition, the avoidance should touch fields other than personal injury
and do away with damages for alienation of affection, and social
deprivation, through enticement."3
The ideal of impartial medical testimony is the elimination of
the "Swearing match" between partisan doctors or the choice of
physicians of known views by partisan lawyers. Assuming that
objective truth would be spoken by the doctor testifying it must
still be admitted that the basic problem discussed in this article
remains. A great deal of the jury's evaluative problem is alleviated,
but this is primarily because there is less testimony to evaluate.
The absence of conflict gives less reason for them to be incredulous
but this testimony will still be measured and evaluated against
their own common sense and experience. This would seem to be
one of the lessons of the Chicago Jury Project. The jury would
likely take the doctor's impartial testimony with the same grain of
salt they take all testimony.
Other partial, but worthwhile solutions are to be found in
the proposals which recommend court administrators, pre-trial
conference, certificates of readiness, and arbitrators. Each has to
do with the efficient disposition of cases which actually progress
3
0 Gi]iam, How May the Disposition of PersonalInjury Litigation be Improved?, 48 A.B.AJ. 834 (1962), the 1962 Ross Prize Essay; and Schulman,
Reducing Congestion in Trial Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 999 (1960) also a Ross
Prize3 Essay.
1
Berger, supra note 28. Cf. L. GnamN, op. cit. supra note 27 at 88 who
would give full damages with the exception that there would be no award
for pain
32 and suffering.
Plant, supra note 20, suggests that pain and suffering is worthy of
recognition because of the dignity of the individual but would limit the award
to one half of the medical and hospital expense.
8 For a comprehensive survey of such items of damage see generally
Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U. kI.. L.F. 493.
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as far as the pleading stage. In a certain fashion they affect cases
yet unfiled in their in terrorem effect. However, as the delay in
the courts is only partially caused by inefficient methods, lazy
judges, and pettifogging lawyers, methods which will militate
against these ills will only partially cure. Each is good and should
be adopted for its own worth rather than as a desperate expedient
designed to clean up a bad situation.
The big offender is the unitary trial with the lump sum judgment. This produces the uncertainty factor which plagues the doctors and the jury and causes the litigants to exaggerate for fear
their true position will not receive recognition in the verdict.
It is urged that if there is to be radical change, and this
seems foregone, that it consist in the change of verdicts from immutable lump sums to lump sum payable by installments, susceptible to modification. In more colorful words, we should establish
an "open end verdict."
To take a simple illustrative case, we might imagine a worker
with a work-life expectancy of ten years, earning three thousand
dollars a year without hope of more income. Let us further assume
that he has suffered blindness due to traumatic injury of the optic
nerve and is totally disabled, but without pain. His prospective
damages will clearly be thirty thousand dollars if the psychological
damages are ignored. Aside from his psychological damages, which
are difficult of computation, there are other uncertainty factors in
this case. If he is awarded thirty thousand dollars and dies from
non-traumatic causes within anything short of the ten years, his
heirs will receive a windfall of his future wages which they would
not have gotten had there been no tortious act of defendant. But
by hypothesis, the defendant's tortious act did not produce the
worker's death. Accordingly, whatever compassion might say, logic
compels the realization that injustice has been worked. The same
thing would be applicable if, to be more cheerful, he miraculously
recovers. Again, barring technological or other economic unemployment, the defendant provides a windfall. The social machinery
is creaking.
These considerations not only cause the defendant to refuse
to settle, but they may govern the jury's deliberations. It is folklore, for instance, among trial lawyers that in a suit for wrongful
death a pretty young widow is likely to get less at the hands of
the jury than her plainer sister. The jury has discounted the verdict
because of the likelihood of remarriage in the offing and a diminution of need.
If, however, the verdict is capable of rectification in case the
need for reparation of wages disappears, this anxiety will not
trouble the jury, nor need it be a bargain conditioning factor in
the minds of the parties as they explore settlement. The verdict
will be given for the full amount and will be modified only if the
fortuitous event takes place.
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One of the most vexatious problems confronting the doctor
and the jury which must act upon his testimony is the possibility
of some enhancement of plaintiffs disability which has not manifested itself at trial time but which may occur at a later date. This
poses a true conundrum to the jury in that if they indulge plaintiff
they may give him money he will never merit, and if they do
not, and the doleful prediction comes to pass, their mistake is beyond recall. A verdict containing in gross all of the items of damage present and prospective, including an apportionment for the
yet unmanifested damages, would alleviate this uncertainty factor.
If the event comes to fruition then the sum will be paid. If, for
instance, the possibility is blindness resulting from a now apparently innocuous eye injury, the defendant will not object to being
cast in judgment for this event, because he will not have to pay
for it unless the event occurs.
Upon the rendition of the verdict which would specify the
various damage elements and their value, the retrospective components would be payable forthwith. The prospective elements
would be payable according to the schedule set out in the jury
award. The periodic loss of earnings would be payable for the
work-life expectancy of the plaintiff. The fund for pain and suffering would likewise be divided into periodic payments conditioned,
as would be the future medical expenses, on the duration ascertained by the jury from the doctors testimony. These installment
payments would continue until one party or another believes that
they are no longer applicable because of an alleviation or worsening of plaintiff's condition or the fortuitous death of plaintiff.3 4
The remedy would be by motion raising the issue of changed
condition. Some sanction, such as imposition of attorney's fees,
should be available for flagrant abuse of the court's time. This
would prevent not only the defendant's fishing expedition to reduce his damages, or his attempt by harassment to effect some
concession from plaintiff, but would also prevent plaintiff from
chancing a hearing in the hope that defendant's motion although
well taken would fail because of his inability to marshal convincing
proof. Where good faith is apparent there should be no allocation
of costs.
The field for abuse of such a scheme is limited. Malingering
is possible here, as it is in the present scheme. However, it is sub3
4 This proposal has advanced the theory that a complete prognosis should
be a part of the trial and that damages, including inchoate ones should be
found and apportioned in the verdict so that later reference could be made
to it if the injury worsened. This is not to say that a scheme which would
allow subsequent issues of fact to be tried as new ills arise would not be
workable. There seems little reason to make an exclusive choice of procedure,
The .principal argument against successive trials is the defendant's vulnerability to plaintiffs claims which might stem from other causes than the accident. The more remote the trial is from the occurrence the more difficult
is disproof of causation. It would seem that some outer limit should be set
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mitted that this scheme will discourage malingering, rather than
encourage it. Under the present method the determined malingerer
need only keep up his pretense until the award is final and then
he is free to do as he pleases. In the proposed scheme malingering
on a life time basis is rendered necessary.8 5 The strain is never
lifted from the faker and he truly earns his daily bread by his
histrionic talents. If he forsakes the act for labor he risks getting
caught and not only is his likely distaste for the constant, now
poorly-paying gamble calculated to lead him away from this
course of conduct, but also, the chance of getting more lucrative
means of support may direct him into paths of rectitude.
The principal risk lies in the possibility that juries, on their
own motion or aided by counsel, may cram into the item of experienced pain and suffering all the money they want plaintiff to
have, thus giving him prospective damages in praesenti. Any such
device, whatever its genesis, is transparent and should be a fundamental inconsistency between future disability for labor and freedom from pain. If the award for pain is all retrospective and an
award for future medical expenses and loss of wages is given the
improper device is exposed.
The problem of administration would not seem to be an insuperable one. Proof of return to activity incompatible with the
basis for damages would indicate a justification for termination of
payments. If plaintiff returns to work or engages in recreational or
other activities of a similar nature, examination should proceed
into the possibility of terminating his award for lbss of earnings,
and possibly his award for pain and suffering. In short, if he
returns to work or ceases to seek medical help he does not hurt,
or at least he does not hurt so much, and should no longer be compensated in full for pain. This is not to say that the law should be
insensitive to reality. A plaintiff whose return to non-work activity
indicates freedom from pain and freedom from disability is not ipso
facto employable and therefore undeserving of damages. If his
period of disability has rendered him incapable of resuming employment because of non-medical economic factors, such as technological incompetence, he is nonetheless disabled and his economic distress is traceable to defendant. Reduction of damages in this
situation should not follow.
Evidence of resumption of work should be relatively easy to
garner. The record keeping attendant upon economic by-products
such as taxes, insurance and Social Security makes a surreptitious
return to work an unlikely event. This assurance does not apply
to proof of new ills allegedly stemming from the accident. A principle of
would seem apposite.
remoteness
35

See Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1408 (1953) the cases indicating that the
maintenance of artificial conduct for long periods of time is unlikfely even
though to abandon such conduct jeopardizes money interests. This annotation
treats of violations of the "confinement to the house" provisions of disability
insurance policies.
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to the self employed nor to casual or itinerant workers, but these
compose only a small fraction of the labor force. And, as society
becomes more complex, the paper depositing activities increase in
ever widening circles.
Account must be taken of the fact that personal injury litigation is not a simple contest between two antagonists. Two other
powerful forces are in the field and are directly affected by the
proposal. These are lawyers whose fees are contingent on success
and the insurance companies. The latter not only provide the bulk
of defense representation but pay the lion's share of the money
which changes hands as the result of tortious activity.
In the typical personal injury case the lawyer is compensated
for his services by a percentage of the recovery, if any. Although
practice varies, the fee is generally computed on the net sum after
deduction of medical expenses and costs of litigation. This results
in plaintiff's net recovery, his "take home" damages, being less
than his proof has established he needs. His economic equilibrium
has not been, in fact, restored. This is an inescapable conclusion.
The only instances in which plaintiff becomes economically whole
is where substantial damages have been awarded for pain and
suffering or where his prospective damages for other than pain
and suffering have been inadvertently or intentionally exaggerated.
The fee, in these cases, is taken from the non-economic damages.
The impact of the proposed scheme on this pattern of activity
would be dramatic. Of the six items of damage only the three retrospective ones would be paid at the time of verdict. Barring the
possibility of a well insured or affluent plaintiff the damages representing medical and hospital expenses are spoken for upon receipt. And, in like fashion, deprivation of earnings is probably
reflected in creditors with outstretched hands. The only unencumbered fund is that for past pain and suffering. Arguably it would
be applicable in totality to the lawyer's fee. If this did not retire
the client's debt to his lawyer then the future components would
become subject to his demand. The same considerations apply in
this aspect. Unless those to whom plaintiff is or will become indebted are ignored, the only available fund is that for prospective
pain and suffering. Whether such delicacy in allocation of verdict
components to fees and debts obtains now, or could be made to
obtain, reflection indicates that the lawyer's compensation, if it
remains contingent, would be tied to the accuracy of the trial
prophecy and subject to the same infirmities. This is not likely to
be a popular predicament. However, one bright note is seen in the
tax advantage to the lawyer who would be drawing his fee over a
period of years instead of all in one year, and paying taxes accordingly.
Benefit is also to be seen for the insurance companies. Inasmuch as the verdicts would not be payable in toto the money not
yet due would be their funds available for investment. The sums
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paid in excess of plaintiffs needs under the present system could
be saved entirely as future events demonstrate the faultiness of
trial prophecy.
There would be, of course, problems of supervision which are
not part of the present system. In the current practice attention is
focused on the claimant for a relatively short period and then,
when disposition is achieved through settlement or trial, the file
is closed and scrutiny is abandoned. Such scrutiny, when needful,
would be of much longer duration, but the key to the burden is the
needfulness of scrutiny. The insurance industry has vast experience
in such matters, and their accumulated knowledge would tell them
whether to close a file or to continue surveillance. A blinded art
critic's file might well be closed. A blinded school teacher, singer
or disc jockey would bear watching.
Of course the sums available under the limits of insurance
policies are often insufficient to satisfy the damages proven. When
this is the case, the insurance obligation to pay installments should
be proportionate. If their insurance covers one half of the verdict
their responsibility should be for one half of the installment. This,
at least, would seem to be the workable solution.
The last head of inquiry pertains to the desirability or acceptability of such innovation. That it is acceptable is indicated by
Kalven:
"And more than one jury has been puzzled as to why the future
cannot be left in the custody of the court to be adjusted as
the future events require much in the fashion of alimony payments."386
Perhaps a more pragmatic test of acceptability is the verdict
of an Oklahoma jury which provided that the gross sum 87of damages
should be paid in installments over a period of years.
CONCLUSION
It takes little discernment to see that the whole spectrum of
personal injury handling is disquieting. Not only is it evident from
the raw statistics of court delay and the imposing figures of ecostudies
of serious
and quality
quantity
the of
nomic
directeddislocation,
toward thisbut
sector
legal endeavor
indicate
well informed
concern. The situation calls for a remedy. Many have been proposed and caution urges discrimination in our choice, but a remedy
must be found.
s6Kalven, supra note 16 at 165.
37 M. & P. Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 326 P.2d 804 (Okla. 1958). The verdict was for $36,000, to be paid at $150 per month for 20 years. The court
said the verdict was improper but not invalid.
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